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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

:

v.

:

JESUS A. SEPULVEDA,

:

Defendant-Respondent.

Case No. 920163-CA

Category No. 2

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The sole issue presented in this petition for rehearing
is whether the Court overlooked relevant law in conducting a sua
sponte plain error analysis of an issue that was raised by
defendant for the first time on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jesus A. Sepulveda, was charged with
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with the intent to
distribute, a second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1991) (R. 2). After the trial court denied
defendant's motion to suppress evidence, a jury convicted
defendant as charged (R. 22, 26-41, 70-74, 131).
The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one to
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and imposed various fines
and fees (R. 150). The court then suspended defendant's sentence
and imposed a 36-month term of probation (R. 150-51).
On appeal, this Court affirmed defendant's conviction
in an opinion issued October 27, 1992.

State v. Sepulveda, 198

Utah Adv. Rep. 69 (Utah App. Oct. 27, 1992) (a copy is attached
as an addendum).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State does not disagree with the facts stated in
the Court's opinion, Sepulveda, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 69-70.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court's sua sponte plain error treatment of the
scope of detention issue is inconsistent with other decisions of
the Court.

Furthermore, the Court's inconsistent application of

the waiver rule undermines the integrity of appellate review in
criminal cases and may have serious consequences for federal
habeas review of Utah appellate court decisions.
INTRODUCTION
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court
has misapplied the law.

See Cummins v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157,

172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913).

The argument portion of this

brief will demonstrate that the State's petition for rehearing is
properly before the Court and should be granted.
ARGUMENT
IN CONDUCTING A SUA SPONTE PLAIN ERROR
ANALYSIS OF AN ISSUE RAISED BY DEFENDANT FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, THE COURT
MISAPPLIED THE LAW OF WAIVER
In addressing defendant's "scope of detention"
argument, this Court correctly noted that defendant raised the
issue for the first time on appeal and did not urge the Court to
apply a plain error analysis, an exception to the waiver rule.
Sepulveda, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 71, 72 n.4. Nevertheless, the
2

Court conducted a full-blown plain error analysis. Id. at 72-73.
Although the Court purports to "decline to consider the scope of
detention issue for the first time on appeal" in light of its
conclusion that the trial court did not commit plain error, id.
at 73/ such an approach misapplies the waiver rule.
It is well settled that Utah appellate courts will not
consider an issue, even a constitutional one, for the first time
on appeal.
1992);

State v, Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 & n.2 (Utah App.

State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991);

State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990).
courts recognize two exceptions to that rule:
exceptional circumstances.

The appellate

plain error or

Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922.

However, the defendant must demonstrate one of the exceptions
before the appellate court will look past the waiver and address
the merits of the issue raised for the first time on appeal.

See

Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 925 ("We conclude that a defendant may
not assert a constitutional issue for the first time on appeal
unless he can demonstrate "plain error" or "exceptional
circumstances."); Webb, 790 P.2d at 78 (refusing to consider
issue raised for first time on appeal because defendant "has not
contended that the plain error exception should apply or that any
special circumstances justify his failure to present this
particular ground for the motion to suppress to the trial
court"); State In Interest of M.S., 781 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah
App. 1989) ("Although reviewing courts will, in the exceptional
or extraordinary case, overlook a party's failure to raise

3

constitutional challenges in the proceedings below, M.S. has not
persuaded us of the existence of such exceptional circumstances
in this case.").
Here, defendant argued neither plain error nor
exceptional circumstances to avoid the obvious waiver on appeal.
Nevertheless, the Court addressed the plain error question sua
sponte.
In sum, the Court's plain error treatment of the scope
of detention issue, in the absence of any plain error argument by
defendant, is contrary to the direction in Archambeau, Webb, and
M.S. that the defendant must demonstrate an exception to the
waiver rule.

It therefore represents an inconsistent application

of the waiver rule by this Court.

This undermines the integrity

of the Court's appellate review in criminal cases (i.e., why does
Sepulveda get the benefit of sua sponte plain error analysis when
Webb did not, Webb, 790 P.2d at 78).
Inconsistent application of the waiver rule also has
serious consequences in federal habeas proceedings.

In Coleman

v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 1382-83 (10th Cir. 1989), cert, denied,
110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals made
clear that the procedural default rule of Wainwriaht v. Svkes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977), which bars federal habeas review when the
state courts have declined to review a federal issue due to a
procedural default (waiver) by the defendant (e.g., failure to
comply with a state contemporaneous objection rule), does not
apply when the state waiver rule has not been consistently
4

applied.

In short, inconsistent application of the waiver rule

by this Court invites wholesale federal habeas review of this
Court's decisions that have disposed of federal questions on the
basis of waiver.

That sort of pervasive review of state court

decisions is clearly undesirable, in that it undermines the
state's weighty interest in the finality of criminal judgments.
See Boaaess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1981) (emphasizing
that "integrity of the criminal justice system requires a
finality of judgment that should limit repetitive appeals and
collateral attacks" once the normal appellate process has
concluded).
In sum, the Court should eliminate from its opinion the
plain error analysis of the scope of detention issue and simply
decline to address the issue on the grounds that defendant did
not present it to the trial court and on appeal did not argue
either the plain error or exceptional circumstance exception to
the waiver rule.

This would bring the decision in line with

Archambeau, Webb, and M.S.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should grant
rehearing and modify its opinion to conform with its own waiver
law.

Utah R. App. P. 35(c).
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The State certifies that this petition is presented in
good faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /O ^cfev of November, 1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

IAN DECKER
istant Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
U
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage
prepaid, to Milton T. Harmon, Attorney for Appellant, 36 South
Main Street, P.O. Box 97, Nephi, Utah 84648, this /^"^day of
November, 1992.
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Cite as
The Commission found that Johnson suffered
incapacity as early as June 26, 1987, and no I
198 Utah Adv. Rep. 69
later than December 1987 because Johnson may I
have missed work in June or July 1987 and did
IN THE
miss work in December 1987 because of his I
UTAH
COURT
OF APPEALS
laryngitis. 'The record amply supports these ]
findings and Johnson fails to show any flaw in I
the evidence upon which the Commission I STATE of Utah,
relied.3 Accordingly, because Johnson did not I Plaintiff and Appellee,
marshal the evidence in support of the I • .
Commission'sfindingsand then demonstrate that I Jesus A. SEPULVEDA,
those findings were unsupported by substantial I Defendant and Appellant
evidence, we accept the findings of the I
Commission as conclusive. Stewart, £31 P.2d at I No. 920163-CA
138.
FILED: October 27,1992
Johnson also claims that the Commission I
applied the incorrect statute of limitations to his I Fourth District, Juab County
action. Because he failed to raise this issue I The Honorable George E. Ballif
before the ALJ or before the Commission, we I
will not consider it for the first time on review* I ATTORNEYS:
Meniam v. Board ofReview, Z12V.24447,451 I Milton T. Harmon, Nephi, for Appellant
(Utah App. 1991); Rekward v. Industrial IR. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker, Salt Lake
Comm'n, 755 P.2d 166,168 (Utah App. 1988).
•City, for Appellee

CONCLUSION
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme.
We accept die findings of die Commission I
establishing that Johnson's cause of action arose I
no later than January 1988, and that Johnson II litis opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
failed to fik his claim within the time allowed I]
by Utah Code Ann. {32-2*48 (1988). We do not
address Johnson's claim that the Commission I BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
applied the improper statute of limitations II Defendant Jesus A. Sepulveda appeals his jury
because he failed to xaise it -before the II conviction for possession of a controlled
Commission.
II substance with intent to distribute, a
I second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Accordingly, we affirm.
I
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
I Ann. J58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992). We
I affirm.
I CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
I
FACTS
I CONCUR IN RESULT:
JI
]
On
January
30,
1990, Officer Paul V.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
]
I Mangelson stopped a Camaro sports car near
1 Nephi, Utah after observing the car had an
] expired registration sticker. Defendant, the
1. This review is distinguishable from both a de novoJ driver, was traveling in the company of a
ceview and the "any competent evidence" standard of
I woman and a juvenile. All were Hispanic.
review. Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68.
2. An appellate court need not, and will not, consider1 Officer Mangelson observed "[t]he interior was
any facts not properly cited to or supported by the I quite cluttered up, and it appeared that they'd
been living in the car."
record. Uckerman v. Uncqln Nat'I Life Ins, Co.,I 588
1 Officer Mangelson asked defendant for his
P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978).
3. Nowhere in the record or in Johnson*s brief does 1 driver's license and Tegistration. Defendant
Johnson question the definition of the term I produced an expired California temporary
"incapacity" as used in Utah Code Ann. {35-2-48 I driving permit and had no registration
(1988). In fact, Johnson consistently equates I information for the car. Defendant claimed a
incapacity with missed work. We assume, but do notI friend in California loaned him the vehicle for
decide, that "incapacity" is linked to missed work andI his return trip to Utah when the truck in which
we decline to extend our analysis to an independent
Teview of this issue when Johnson has failed to so I he traveled to California broke down.
I As the conversation continued, Officer
posture his challenge.
I Mangelson observed defendant grow nervous
I and begin to shake. Officer Mangelson inquired
I whether defendant was carrying "contraband*1 in
I the car, and defendant responded negatively.
I Next, Officer Mangelson asked to search the
I vehicle for guns, alcohol, or drugs, and
I defendant said, "Go ahead." Officer Mangelson
I requested defendant and the two passengers to
exit the car. During a pat-down search, Officer
UTAH ADVANCE
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State •. Sepulveda
198 Utoh AdytRep. 69

Mangelson discovered in the juvenile's back
pocket a pipe commonly used for smoking
marijuana.
Officer Mangelson asked defendant to open
the trunk. Defendant stated he had no key to the
trunk but broke the lock with a screwdriver so
Officer Mangelson could search the trunk. After
ascertaining the trunk contained no contraband,
Officer Mangelson proceeded to the interior of
the car. He observed that the screws on the back
of the driver's bucket seat were marred. At
some point before Officer Mangelson removed
these screws, the woman passenger identified
herself to Officer Mangelson as an undercover
DEA agent. She told Officer Mangelson she was
certain the car contained narcotics but did not
know where they were hidden. Officer
Mangelson removed the screws on the back of
the front seat, revealing a compartment
containing cocaine.
Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine on
the ground that it was illegally seized. In support
of his motion to suppress, defendant argued he
never voluntarily consented to the search of the
vehicle, and Officer Mangelson had no probable
cause to search. The trial court denied
defendant's motion. Defendant was convicted by
a jury as charged. Despite his arguments below,
on appeal defendant additionally claims the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because Officer Mangelson unreasonably
detained him beyond the scope of the original
traffic stop. Defendant also argues he gave no
voluntary consent, and there was no probable
cause to search the vehicle.
In examining a denial of a motion to suppress,
we review the trial court's findings of fact
"under a 'clearly erroneous' standard" and the
trial court's "ultimate legal conclusions" based
on those findings "under a 'correctness'
standard." State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040,1043
(Utah App. 1992).

Code*Co
Provo, Utdb

claims the warrantless search wait constitutional
because [the defendant] has no expectation of
privacy in the area searched, then the defendant
must factually demonstrate . . . standing to
contest the warrantless search/ State v.
Marshall, 791 P.2d880, 887(Utah App), cert
denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
La determining whether a defendant has shown
the requisite expectation of privacy in the area
searched, we employ a two-step test First, we
examine whether - the defendant: "has
demonstrated 'a' subjective expectation of
privacy in the object of the challenged search.'"
Taylor, 818 P.2d at 565 (quoting United States
v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir.
1989)); accord State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 80
(Utah App. 1990). Second, we conclude, as a
matter of law, "whether society is 'willing to
recognize the individual's expectation of privacy
as legitimate.9" Taylor, 818 P.2d at 565 (quoting
Hastamorir, 881 F.2d at 1560); accord Webb,
790 P.2d at 80. This test does not provide a
"bright line" standard because "no single factor
invariably will be determinative" in judging the
reasonableness of privacy expectations. Rakas,
439 U.S. at 152, 99 S. a . at 435 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
Utah courts have concluded a defendant must
have at least permissive, possessory control of
the car to contest a warrantless automobile
search. See State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125,
126-27 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); State v.
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 n.6 (Utah App.
1990); State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194,200 (Utah
App. 1987) (Greenwood, J:, concurring and
dissenting).
In Constantino, police officers stopped the car
the defendant was driving because one of the
officers knew the defendant's driver's license
had been suspended and there was an
outstanding warrant for. the defendant's
passenger. See Constantino, 732 P.2d at 125.
The officers subsequently confirmed this
STANDING.
information through dispatch. See id. When the
As a threshold issue, the State claims defendant told the officers the registered owner
defendant lacks standing to challenge the search of the car was "a Mr. Groberg," the officers
of the vehicle. The State argues the trial court impounded die car until they could find a
actually found defendant had no standing.1 In licensed driver or contact the owner. Id. An
any event, we review the trial court's conclusion inventory search of the car revealed two plastic
as to whether defendant had a legitimate bags of marijuana bearing the defendant's
expectation of privacy under a correctness fingerprints. See id. at 125-26. The defendant
standard, affording no deference. See State v. moved to suppress the evidence, arguing lack of
probable cause to stop and search the vehicle.
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App. 1991).
Fourth Amendment rights are personal in See id. at 126.
nature and "'may not be vicariously asserted.'"
The Utah Supreme Court declined to reach the
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,133, 99 S. Ct. defendant's arguments concerning the validity of
421, 425 (1978) (quoting Alderman v. United the search, concluding:
States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S. Ct. 961, 966
[T]he facts here show no right to
(1969)); accord Taylor, 818 P.2d at 565.
possession. [The officer's brief
Therefore, to challenge the propriety of a
investigation of defendant revealed that die
search, a defendant must establish "a legitimate
car was registered to a person other than
expectation of privacy in the invaded place."
defendant. Defendantpresented no testimony
that he had driven the car with the
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S. Ct. at 430;
permission of the owner or that he had
accord State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056, 1058
borrowed the car under circumstances that
(Utah App. 1992). Furthermore, "[o|nce the
would imph permissive use. Absent claimed
defendant has been put on notice that the state
UTAH: ADVANCE REPORTS
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right to possession, he could not assert any
belongings in the car has -a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the items seized
expectation of privacy in the car and its
and had no standing to object to the search. contents. In contrast to the defendant in
Id. at 126-27 (emphasis mddtd); accord State v. Constantino, defendant in the present case told
Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah App. 1987) Officer Mangelson he was driving the car with
i'"Wc agree with the reasoning in State v. the owner's permission. As in Robinson,
Constantino, that there must be at least a defendant's statement that he borrowed the car
claimed right to possession in the property."), he was driving with the owner's permission was
aJTd in part and rev'd in part, 794 ?.2d 460 sufficient to confer "a legitimate expectation of
(Utah 1990).
privacy in the entire [car] interior." Robinson,
s
In Robinson, a police officer stopped a van in 797P.2dat437n.6.
Defendant's claim that he had permission to
which the defendants Towers and Robinson were
i raveling for driving erratically. See Robinson, drive die Camaro was unrefuted, he had
797 P.2d at 433. Both defendants produced valid personal belongings within the car's interior,
"California driver's licenses and a registration and Officer Mangelson had no information the
:fisting"Paul Jarred" as the registered owner. Id. car was stolen at the time of the search.
! Defendant Robinson, riding in the passenger Therefore, we are persuaded defendant
•eat, told the officer Mr. Jarred was his demonstrated an expectation of privacy sufficient
employer and had permitted them to take the van to permit him to challenge Officer Mangelson's
on a two-week vacation. See id. A check with warrantless search of the car.
police dispatch revealed the van was not
reported stolen. See id. After observing a
SCOPE OF DETENTION
iiomemade bed, two amall gym bags, and a
Defendant, for the first time on appeal, claims
fishing pole in the back of die van, the officers Officer Mangelson unreasonably detained him
decided to conduct a search, ultimately after the initial traffic stop when Officer
discovering marijuana hidden under the bed. See Mangelson requested to search the car. The
id. at 434. The trial court denied the defendants' State responds that we should not consider this
motion to auppraas the drug evidence. See id. issue as defendant raises it for the first time on
We stated:
appeal.
A police officer may legally stop a vehicle
The defendants* testimony that they were
incident to a traffic offense. See Lopez, 831
fiven permission by the owner to take die
P.2d at 1043; State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155,
van on a two-week vacation trip was not
157-58 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Roth, 827
disputed by die State. We hold that they
P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992). Defendant
established a possessory interest in the van
does not challenge his initial stop, based upon an
sufficient to give them both a legitimate
expired registration sticker. However, the length
expectation of privacy in the entire van
and scope of a police officer's detention of a
interior.
vehicle for a traffic violation must be "'strictiy
Id. at437n.6.
In the instant case, Officer Mangelson was the tied to and justified by' the circumstances which
bnly witness to testify at the hearing on rendered its initiation permissible." State v.
defendant's motion to suppress. Officer Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991)
Mangelson stated dial when he inquired how (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88
defendant obtained possession of the car, S. Ct 1868, 1879 (1968)); accord State v.
defendant responded "the car belonged to a Hansen, 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 27,28 (Utah App.
friend in California." According to Officer 1992).
Mangelson, defendant said he and his passengers
Utah courts have determined "(a]n officer
had been given permission from a friend to conducting a routine traffic stop may request a
drive this car to Utah. Officer Mangelson driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct
initially noted the interior of die car was a computer check, and issue a citation."
cluttered, as if defendant and his passengers had Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435; accord Johnson, 805
been living in die car.
P.2d at 763. The officer may also check for
Therefore, at die time of the search, die facts • outstanding warrants "so long as k does not
established (1) defendant was driving die car, (2) significantly extend the period of detention."
defendant had permission to use the car, and (3) . State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 280
defendant had personal belongings in the car.
(Utah App. 1992). However, once the occupants
of the vehicle have satisfied the reasons for the
( Following the two-step standard outlined in
Taylor, we first conclude defendant's statement initial stop, the officer must permit them to
that the car belonged to a friend in California proceed. See Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 158. "Any
who loaned it to defendant demonstrates a further temporary detention for investigative
-subjective expectation of privacy in the car. We questioning after the fulfillment of the purpose
must next conclude, as a matter of law, whether for the initial traffic stop is justified under the
this statement manifests an expectation of fourth amendment only if the detaining officer
privacy society is willing to recognize as has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal
.legitimate. See Taylor, 818 P.2d at 565.
activity/ Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435; accord
In the cases summarized above,3 a driver who ' Hansen, 193 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28.
has permission to use a vehicle and has personal
The State correctly asserts that defendant
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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failed to complain about the scope of his speaking to the defendants, die officer requested
detention during the suppression proceedings and received permission to search the van. See
below. Although counsel for defendant renewed id. at 433-34. The officer discovered marijuana
defendant's motion to suppress twice during during the search and arrested the defendants.
trial, for some unexplained reason counsel ntvtr See id. at 434.
questioned the legality of defendant's detention
On appeal, the defendants in Robinson claimed
until this appeal. Defendant is represented by the their continued detention after the officer had
same counsel on appeal. Even on appeal, issued a citation constituted a seizure in violation
counsel's treatment of the issue is cursory ** of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 435. We
best.4
stated the proper inquiry was "'whether the
A defendant is ordinarily precluded from officer's action was justified at its inception, and
asserting a claim for the first time on appeal whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
unless the trial court committed plain error. See circumstances which justified k in the first
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 ([Utah place.*" Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20,
App. 1991). The Utah Supreme Court has 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79). We noted the defendants'
outlined the guidelines for determining "plain nervousness, failure to make eye contact with
the officer, improper clothing and equipment for
error" as follows:
the weather, and failure to produce written
The first requirement for a finding of plain
permissionfromthe owner were insufficient "to
error is that the error be "plain,11 i.e., from
justify the roadside detention and questioning
our examination of the record, we must be
that followed." Id. at 436. We concluded die
able to say that it should have been obvious
officer's detention of defendants and request to
to a trial court that it was committing error.
search after "the purposes for the initial atop had
. . . The second and somewhat interrelated
been accomplished" was "a violation of their
requirement for a finding of plain error is
fourth amendmentrights."Id. at 437.
that the error affect the substantialrightsof
the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful.
In Marshall, a police officer stopped the car
Id. (quoting State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 the defendant was driving for am equipment
(Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct malfunction. See Marshall, 791 P.2d at 881. In
62 (19S9)); accord State v. EWfiitz, 835 P3d response to the officer's request; the defendant
170, 174 (Utah App. 1992); see also State v. produced a New York driver's license and a
Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 35 (Utah California rental contractforthe automobile. See
1992) (Appellate courts review claims of plain id. Th6 defendant told the officer he was
error "because, if the error is obvious, the trial traveling to Denver to ski and would return the
court has the opportunity to address the error car to San Diego. See id. at 881-82. The officer
regardless of the fact that it was never brought became suspicious of the defendant's travel
plans, however, when he noted that the rental
to the court's attention.").
Therefore, in the present case-, we must first agreement specified the car would be returned in
determine whether the necessity of addressing New York in five days. See id. at 882. After
Officer Mangelson's detention of defendant after issuing the defendant a . citation for die
the traffic stop "should have been obvious" to equipment problem and returning the license and
rental contract, the officer asked the defendant
the trial court.
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor if he had any alcohol, drugs, orfirearms.See
the Utah Supreme Court has focused precisely id. When the defendant said he did not, the
upon the issue of whether an officer's request officer asked to "iook inside the vehicle." Id.
for consent to search a vehicle after a routine The defendant replied, "'Go ahead." Id* A
traffic stop is beyond the scope of detention. search of the trunk revealed a controlled
However, two cases from the Utah Court of substance. See id.
Appeals addressing this issue were decided only
On appeal, we applied the same standard set
recently before October 3, 1990, the date of the forth in Robinson. See id. at 884. We also noted
hearing on defendant's motion to suitress, there is no "bright-line rule as to the acceptable
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (issued July 18, 1990) length of a detention because 'common sense
and Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (issued April 18, and ordinary human experience must govern
1990). Moreover, the certiorari petition in over rigid criteria.'" Id. (quoting United States
Marshall was still pending as of the date of the v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,685,105 S. Ct 1568,
suppression hearing.
1575 (1985)). When reviewing the scope of
In Robinson, a police officer stopped a van for detention, the focus should not be on the length
a traffic violation. See Robinson, 797 P.2d at alone but on-"whether die police diligently
433. After receiving the driver's valid license pursued a means of investigation that was likely
and registration, learning the defendants had to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly,
borrowed the van with their employer's during which time it was necessary to detain the
permission to go fishing in Wyoming, defendant." Id. (quoting Sharpe, 470 UUS. at
determining the van had not been reported 686, 105 S. Ct. at 1575).
stolen, and issuing a citation, the officer farther
The police officer in Marshall examined the
detained the defendants. See id. Based upon the defendant's driver's license and rental contract
officer's observation of a homemade bed, two and issued a warning citationfora defective turn
gym bags, and a fishing pole in the van while "P*l_ wjtfrin _*«• ™*™*«n nf ricrrv^t ***>
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defendant. See id. However, the officer's further
detention of the defendant and request to search
were appropriate because the defendant's
destination itinerary would have made a
reasonable officer suspect the defendant was
involved in illegal activity. See id. Therefore,
we admitted that, "[although it is a close 0811,"
the officer's questioning and detention of the
defendant "was justified because he had
reasonable suspicion to believe [the defendant]
was engaged in a more serious crime." Id.
Significantly, all other pertinent opinions
holding that a request to search a car following
a traffic stop exceeded the scope of detention
have been filed subsequent to the October 3,
1990 hearing on defendant's motion to suppress.
In Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, a police officer
pulled the defendants' vehicle over for traffic
violations. See id. at 156. The officer noticed
the defendants were wearing sunglasses, and the
vehicle was cluttered. See id. The officer
subsequently requested and received permission
to search the automobile, ultimately discovering
a controlled substance. Seeid.al 156-57.
On appeal, the defendants questioned the
legality of their continued detention "after the
purpose of the initial traffic stop had been
fulfilled." Id. at 157. We dismissed Lovegren's
nervous behavior, the cluttered appearance of
die car, and the defendants9 bloodshot eyes as
not indicative of criminal activity. See id. at
158. We concluded that, because the officer,
"(wjithout any other indication of criminal
activity . . . simply made the decision to search
the car," the officer's "detention of Defendants
exceeded the scope of die traffic stop." Id. at
158 and 159.
In State v. Godma-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah
App. 1992), a police officer stopped die
defendants' car because he suspected the driver
was intoxicated. See id. at 653. After speaking
with the defendants, die officer was convinced
both were sober; however, die driver began to
shake when asked for his license and
registration. See id. The driver had no license
but gave the officer a California identification
card and the vehicle registration. See id. at 654.
The officer was allowed to search the car, and
he discovered cocaine in the trunk. See id.
On appeal, the State claimed the officer had a
"reasonable suspicion to further detain and
question" the defendants. Id. We reasoned that
nervousness and driving "in a less than direct
route" to a stated destination do not support "a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Id. at
655. We concluded the officer's "detention and
questioning of defendants exceeded the scope of
the stop and was therefore illegal." Id.; see also
State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699,703 (Utah App.
1992) (after defendant produced proper
documentation and officer observed vehicle
identification numbers on car registration and
dashboard were consistent, officer's request to
view vehicle number on car doorpost exceeded
scope of traffic stop).

73

Jin the instant case, Officer Mangelson made a
valid stop of the car defendant was driving
because he observed the car's expired
registration sticker. Officer Mangelson
approached the car and requested defendant's
driver's license and vehicle registration.
Defendant had no registration and produced an
invalid, temporary California driving permit. At
this point, Officer Mangelson did not return to
his patrol car to conduct a computer check, and
the hearing transcript reveals no reference to his
issuing any traffic citation to defendant. Instead,
he appears to have commenced a dialogue with
others in die car. In response to Officer
Mangelson's inquiry, defendant's passengers
said they were defendant's friends but could not
give a reason why they were coming to Utah.
Further extending the scope of detention,
because he observed defendant's nervousness
and the cluttered appearance of die car, Officer
Mangelson asked defendant if he was carrying
contraband. When defendant said he was not,
Officer Mangelson requested and received
permission to search the car for guns, alcohol,
or drugs, ultimately finding cocaine.
Although neither die United States Supreme
Court nor die Utah Supreme Court has
specifically addressed this scope of detention
issue, our recent opinions reveal a
well-developed line of authority.5 Under
Robinson and Marshall, Officer Mangelson's
detention of defendant and request to search may
well have been beyond the scope of the original
traffic stop. However, these opinions had only
recently been decided and certiorari was Mill
pending in Marshall. Because the controlling
case law was still in its infancy at the time of
the suppression proceedings below, we cannot
say any error should have been obvious to the
trial judge. We, therefore, decline to consider
the scope of detention issue for the first time on
appeal.

CONSENT TO SEARCH
A search conducted without a warrant is a per
se violation of the Fourth Amendment unless die
State establishes the existence of at least one of
"*a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.** State v. Arroyo,
796 P.2d 684,687 (Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct.
507, 514 (1967)). One such exception is
consent. See State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296,1301
(Utah App. 1991); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d
460,467 (Utah App. 1991).
On appeal, defendant contends he did not
voluntarily consent to Officer Mangelson's
search of the vehicle. Specifically, defendant
argues that because he does not speak English
fluently and was intimidated by the officer, he
did not voluntarily consent to the search.
Defendant also argues his consent was tainted by
the prior illegal detention.
To determine whether a defendant's consent to
search was lawfully obtained, we apply a
two-part test: "'(1) the consent must be
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voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not
be obtained by police exploitation of the prior
illegality.'" Carter, 812 P.2d at 467 (quoting
Robinson, 797 P.2d at 437); accord Arroyo, 796
P.2d at 688; Godna-Luna, 826 P.2d 1655.
Whether defendant's consent was voluntary in
fact "is a fact sensitive issue to be determined by
examining the totality of the circumstances,"
including "the specific characteristics of the
accused and the details of the police conduct"
Carter, 812 P.2d at 467; accord Arroyo, 796
P.2d at 689; Castner, 825 P.2d at 704. In
addition, factors indicating a lack of coercion in
obtaining a defendant's consent are the officer's
lack "of a claim of authority to search," "the
absence of an exhibition of force" by die officer,
the officer's "mere request to search,"
"cooperation" by the defendant, and the officer's
lack of "deception." Carter, 812 P.2d at 467-68
(quoting State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 107,
106 (Utah 1980)).
The second prong of die test applies only
when "antecedent police illegality exists."
Carter, 812 P.2d at 469. We need not consider
this "attenuation" issue as we have previously
declined to consider defendant's challenge to the
•cope of his detention for the first time on
appeal. Our examination, therefore, focuses
upon whether defendant's consent was
"voluntary in fact"In the present case, Officer Mangebon was
the only witness at the hearing on defendant's
motion to suppress. He stated that defendant
"spoke mostly English" and "spoke fairly good
English/ If defendant could not understand, the
woman passenger would interpret for him,
"which was very seldom." Officer Mangelson
testified that when he asked defendant for
permission to search the car for guns, alcohol,
or drugs, defendant replied, "Go ahead."
Furthermore, although defendant apparently had
no key to the trunk, when Officer Mangelson
asked defendant to open the trunk, defendant
"actually broke the lock on the trunk to open it"
According to the officer, defendant "was that
intent on showing me that there was nothing
there."
In its written decision denying defendant's
motion to suppress, the trial court found that
"uncontr[o]verted testimony shows that consent
was given for the vehicle search and no evidence
would support a showing of the consent being
coerced or in any manner otherwise unlawfully
obtained."
Based on the record, we are not persuaded the
trial court erred in determining defendant
voluntarily consented to a search of the vehicle.
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do not reach defendant's challenge to die legality
of the scope of his detention as he raises this for
the first time on appeal. Therefore, we affirm
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
suppress.
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. In its decision denying defendant's motion to
suppress, the trial court stated:
The two paramountQ considerations that this
set of frets give[s] rise to are whether or not
there was probable cause for the stop of die
vehicle, and a subsequent search of k. There is
also an issue fas] to whether or not As defendant
under the circumstances of this case had any
standing to object ta die officer searching die
„ vehicle aside from the probable cause question,
and lastly whether or not a consent was obtained
to search die vehicle by the trooper from the
defendant.
The Court concludes that the facts in this case
support therightof the trooper to proceed with a
search of the vehicle under- att of the above
issues,
(Emphasis added.)
2. We also agree with Judge Greenwood's reasoning
in DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194. Judge Greenwood found the
defendant had standing to object to an automobile
search because the defendant was driving the car,
possessed keys to the car's ignition and trunk, had
personal belongings inside the car and trunk, *had
complete dominion and control over die area searched
and could exclude all others," and the officer
understood the defendant had permission lo use the
car. Id. at 200-01 (Greenwood, J., concurring and
dissenting).
3* The present case is easily distinguished from eases
in which the defendants lacked standing because the
police officers knew, before conducting a search, that
the vehicles were stolen. See State v. PurceU, 586
P.2d 441, 442 (Utah 1978); State v. Montayne, 18
Utah 2d 38, 414 P.2d 958, 95**0, cert denied, 385
U.S. 939, 87 S. Ct. 305 (1966); see also State v.
Larocco, 742 P.2d at 92 (court distinguishes between
cases where search upheld because "k was clearly
established and not disputed prior to the search that
defendant did not own or did not have an interest in
the property searched" and "those where defendant
asserts ownership of the property or otherwise an
interest giving rise to a 'legitimate expectation of
privacy"),
4. Despite raising the scope of Officer Mangelson's
detention of defendant for the fust time on appeal,
counsel for defendant failed to set forth or urge us to
apply a plain error analysis. Furthermore, counsel
never even cited extensive controlling authority that
die appropriate scope of an officer's detention during
a traffic stop is limited to checking a driver's license
and vehicle registration, conducting a computer check
for outstanding warrants, and issuing a citation. See,
e.g., Johnson, 805 P.2d at 763; Hansen, 193 Utah
Adv. Rep.at28;Icpez, 831 ¥.24 X \043; FigueroaSolorio, 830 P.2d at 280; Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 15758, Roth, 827 P.2d at 257; Robinson, 797 P.2d at
435. Finally, counsel for defendant felled to perceive
that, because he should have raised the scope of

CONCLUSION
In sum, we initially find defendant has
standing to challenge Officer Mangelson's
warrantless search of the car. We conclude
Officer Mangebon lawfully stopped defendant
incident to a traffic violation and conducted a
search of the vehicle defendant was driving
pursuant to defendant's voluntary consent. We
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detention issue before the trial xourt, defendant on
appeal had a potential claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel Rather, counsel improperly
represented defendant again on appeal See Dunn v.
Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 878 (Utah 1990), Fernandez v.
Cook, 783 P 2d 547, 550 (Utah 1989) (petitions for
writ of habeas corpus were meritorious in view of fact
that attorney who represents defendant at trial and on
appeal cannot adequately challenge attorney's own
competence in a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel).
5* See also United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512,
1519-20 (10th Or. 1988) (officer's detention and
search of automobile after examining driver's license,
confirming car not stolen, and issuing citation
exceeded scope of original traffic stop for failure to
wear seat belt).
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